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RECENT DECISIONS

buyer procured by his broker, thereafter all acts and all negotiations
between the accepted prospect and landowner constitute an endless
chain up to the culmination. 6 It is immaterial whether the owner
sold at the same price,7 or at a lower figure than the one given to
the broker, provided that the buyer would have been ready, willing,
and able to pay the original price, for the broker would still remain
the efficient cause of bringing the parties together.8 The question of
"efficient cause" is one of fact.9 Like other questions of fact, it must,
where the facts are in dispute or where more than one inference may
reasonably be drawn, be a question for the jury to determine.1 0
However, where the facts clearly show that the broker did in fact
find the customer and cause the customer and his principal to come
together on the sale, the broker is entitled to a peremptory instruction
that he has procured the purchaser and earned his compensation.
In the instant case, the plaintiff had informed the--purchaser of
the fact that the property was for sale; he had led the purchaser to
the seller; the purchaser was ready, willing and able to pay the original price desired by the defendant seller; in fact a sale was consummated between the purchaser and the defendant. From these facts
the court was manifestly correct in holding that, as a matter of law,
the broker was the efficient cause of bringing the parties together.
Injustice would have resulted if the seller could have circumvented
payment of the commission to the broker by suggesting that the sale
be at the asking price minus that sum to which the broker would
have been entitled.

V.R.

ARBITRATION-%Es JrDIcATA AS TO ALL MATTERS REA soXBLY
COMPREHENDED IN DISPUTE.-In this action the vendor protested

the vendee's attempt to arbitrate on the ground that the vendee's
breach of warranty claim was precluded by a previous judgment.
The previous judgment relied upon was the result of an original
arbitration proceeding in which the vendor was awarded the full contract price for twill goods delivered in accordance with contract.
The instant attempt at arbitration by the vendee was on the theory
of breach of warranty arising from alleged defects in the materialthe same grounds upon which payment had been refused at the
outset. Held, motion to stay arbitration granted. Judgment entered
6
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129 S. W. 2d 75 (1939).
87Jacobs v. McKelvey, 130 Pa. Super. 417, 197 At. 494 (1938).
Hubachek v. Hazzard, supnr note 1.
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upon the original arbitration award was res judicata of ,all matters
reasonably comprehended in the dispute submitted to the arbitrators.
This was the decision despite the non-appearance of the vendee in
the original proceedings. In re Spring Cotton Mills, 275 App. Div.
196, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 295 (1st Dep't 1949).
The reasoning of the decision is based on two premises: (1) the
need for an end to litigation as epitomized in the companion doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 1 and (2) the character
of the arbitration proceeding.
The effect of a judgment as an instrument of collateral estoppel
has been crystallized into two well-settled rules. Where the two
suits are for the same cause of action, the judgment estops both as
to defenses and grounds of recovery actually presented and as to
those which might have been presented. Where the second action
between the same parties is for a different claim, the initial judgment2
estops only as to those matters in issue or points controverted..
These rules apply to default judgments 3 which
are final adjudica4
tions except where statutes provide otherwise.
It is clear that had the former suit been an action at law for the
contract price, the scope of the court's inquiry would not have included a finding on the breach of warranty claim; therefore a judgment thereon would not bar a subsequent action for breach of warranty by the vendee. 5 However, where the character of the first
proceeding of necessity included an inquiry into the facts needed to
sustain the second action, the tendency of the court has been to bar
the second action-undoubtedly on the premise that both parties have
had their day in court. 6
The arbitration method has an individual status as a procedurally
unrestricted forum, 7 the awards of which are not the subject of
review except on the grounds specifically stated in the Civil Practice
1 Webster, Res

Judicata, 107 N. Y. L. J. 1448 (April 7, 1942) ; REsTATE§§ 61-72 (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment,
1 (1942).
2Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U. S. 683 (1895);
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1877); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v.
B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N. Y. 304, 165 N. E. 456 (1929);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
3 Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., supra note 2. See Note,
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128 A. L. R. 472, 474, 478 (1940).
4N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Act § 108. "The court, in its discretion ....

at any

time within one year after notice thereof, may relieve' a party from a judgment, order or other proceeding, taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect."
5 Honsinger v. Union Carriage & Gear Co., 175 N. Y. 229, 67 N. E. 436
(1903). See Note, 128 A. L. R. 472, 503.
6 Hellstern v. Hellstern, 279 N. Y. 327, 18 N. E. 2d 296 (1938) ; Everett
v. Everett, 180 N. Y. 452, 73 N. E. 231 (1905); Williams v. Barkley, 165
N. Y. 48, 58 N. E. 765 (1900); Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150 (1878).
7 Smyth v. Board of Education, 128 Misc. 49, 217 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Sup.
Ct. 1925).
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Act.8 Their scope of inquiry is as broad as any dispute arising out
of or in connection with the contract (except where restricted in the
submission), 9 and their basis is an irrevocable contract 10 which cannot be altered by the act of one party in refusing to arbitrate.1 Thus
the arbitrators have a wide scope of inquiry without regard to the
formalities of counterclaims and their independence as actions. In
the instant case the court rises above the controversy surrounding
the application of the doctrine of res judicata since the Schuylkill
decision,' 2 and solves the problem confronting it by simple syllogistic
reasoning. Arbitration presupposes dispute, premises the court.
The dispute submitted was whether the vendee had a valid objection
to paying the otherwise absolute debt which arose on delivery of the
goods contracted for. Therefore, in awarding the full amount to the
vendor, the merits of the defense were absolutely determined. The
other party's non-appearance in the prior proceeding had no bearing
on the decision, for jurisdiction and consent to the proceeding had
been given beforehand in the original contract.13
The inviolability of contracts is the strength of the arbitration
method. By applying normal contract rules to the arbitration clause,
the courts have succeeded in reducing their already overburdened
calendars. They are loath to vitiate this advantage by allowing further litigation on a valid award. This decision is in line with that
manifest trend.
I. F. B.

BAILMENT-LIABILITY

OF PARKING LOT

OPERATOR.-Plaintiff

parked his automobile on defendant's parking lot and paid a fee to
an employee, who after requesting plaintiff to leave the ignition key
in the lock, inquired when the automobile would be claimed. Plaintiff was uncertain when he would return. The attendant suggested
that he would put the ignition key beneath the floormat of the car
in the event that the plaintiff returned after eleven P.M. at which
time the lot closed. To this the plaintiff agreed. About two hours
8 N. Y.
9

Civ. Pmac. Acr §§ 1462, 1462-a.

Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289 N. Y. 76, 43 N. E. 2d 817 (1942);
Fidler v. Cooper, 19 Wend. 285 (N. Y. 1838); Wheeler v. Van Houton, 12
Johns. 311 (N. Y. 1815); Matter of Pierce v. Brown Buick Co., 258 App.
Div. 679, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 283 N. Y. 669, 28 N. E.
2d 400 (1940) ; Samuel Kaplan & Sons v. Fascinator Blouse Co., 70 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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' N. Y. Crv. PpAc. AcT § 1448.

"Matter of Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923)
(of course either party can bring action in the courts in the first instance and
thus supersede the right to arbitrate).

Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., supra note 2.
'13 N. Y. Crv. PRA.c. ACT § 1450.
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